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Abstract. Smart phones are, nowadays, a necessity for the vast majority of indi‐
viduals around the globe. In addition to the ubiquitous computing paradigm
supported by such devices, there are numerous software applications that utilize
the high computational capabilities that they oﬀer. This type of software is a vital
part of what is known as e-Commerce, with a variety of business models proposed
and implemented. Lately, a new era of free-ware mobile application has arisen
with paid features and promoted content in them. Piracy is not only the weakest
point of software’s ﬁnancial ecosystem for conventional computing systems but
also for smartphones. Actions like replication, redistribution and licensing viola‐
tions can cause ﬁnancial losses of colossal extent to their creators. Mobile appli‐
cations also introduce the following peculiarity: They are distributed through
predeﬁned channels (Application Stores) owned by mobile operating system
vendors such as Apple, Google and Microsoft. In this research we present several
scenarios where cracked and modiﬁed applications can be freely used into every
non jailbroken iOS device. Moreover it is demonstrated that not even in strict
mobile environments, such as Apple’s, end-users should be considered as trusted
entities from application developers by default.
Keywords: Application integrity · Application reverse engineer · Application
security
1 Introduction
Ubiquitous computing is certainly a breakthrough. Two decades ago no one could
imagine that he would be able to carry in his pocket mini computers with extremely high
processing power and capable to provide internet access on demand. In a very short time
smartphones have established their position in the mobile phone market and have
become the accessory that almost everyone uses constantly either for work or for enter‐
tainment.
After Apple launched the ﬁrst iPhone, Google and Microsoft followed, oﬀering new
smartphones and smart devices to the public. Each one of them promised to improve
our living quality and has developed software that was advertised as secure and stable.
During the last couple of years biometric sensors, such as ﬁngerprint sensor and iris
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sensor, were introduced as an extra security level for the protection of the user. However
in practice most mobile applications do have bugs or other vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by malicious parties in order to harm the user. A very interesting debate for
academics and users is the following very simple question “which mobile platform
among iOS, Windows Phone and Android is more secure?” Clearly, there is not an easy
answer, especially since there are a lot of similarities in terms of the security mechanisms
adopted by each platform as all of them follow similar technological paths.
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the mechanisms that the iPhone oper‐
ating system features in order to check the trustworthiness of the applications. Cracked
or prepackaged applications can run on Android devices by simply modifying the default
conﬁguration settings of the mobile phone. This is also true for the Windows Phone,
where untrusted applications can be deployed into any developer unlocked Windows
Phone using the aid of an application deployment tool running on a PC. For Apple
devices the most popular method for executing untrusted applications is the Jailbreak
procedure that bypasses the code signature mechanism and instantly voids the guarantee.
The IOS’s Mandatory Code Signature mechanism aims to ensure that an application can
be executed only if its code has been signed by a trusted party [1]. Thus, prior to an
application’s execution, an internal kernel check veriﬁes that the code loaded into the
virtual memory contains a valid signature and can, thus, proceed with the execution [5].
Any modiﬁcation of a signed executable results in the invalidation of the entire ﬁle/
application. The Mandatory Code Signature mechanism can prevent cracked applica‐
tions of being executed on trusted devices (not Jailbroken) while at the same time trusted
malformed or malicious applications that change their executable code or behave like
droppers [6] cannot execute their payload on non-modiﬁed iOS devices since the execut‐
able code does not have a valid signature. The Jailbreak procedure disables the kernel
code sign check, allowing those devices to run pseudo signed code.
When a developer publishes an application, Apple ensures that the application is
fully functional, bug free and that it does not violate Apple’s security regulations [4].
Following the evaluation, the application is released in the iOS App Store and Mac
iTunes. These applications can execute on any iDevice (iPhone, iPod, iPad) [25] since
they have been signed with Apple’s s private key. This mechanism, as part of the
Mandatory Code Signature scheme explained before, ensures that applications with
illegal content or malicious payloads will not be executed on trusted devices.
Moreover, all the executables of the applications published in the App Store are code
protected with encrypted segments by Apple (connotation of ARMv7-A and ARMv8-
A Mach-O compatible for both 32 and 64 Bit ARM architectures) in order to prevent
any reverse engineering and replication attempts. This kind of obfuscation however is
not eﬀective during runtime dynamic analysis, and thus an attacker can obtain the unen‐
crypted version of an executable when it is loaded into the memory [21].
In this paper we describe costless methods based on iOS Integrated Development
Environment, where any user can overcome the code signature mechanism and execute
cracked or prepackaged applications onto new iDevices. Moreover, the impact of this
ability is highlighted as it could lead to integrity violation of legitimate applications’
transactions, such as in app purchases [18], with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial consequences for
their creators.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
related work and a comparison with the presented approach. In Sect. 3 the anatomy of
an iOS application and its embedded mechanisms is explained, while Sect. 4 describes
the provisioning model for iOS devices. Section 5 introduces practical attacks on paid
and free applications. Section 6 presents our thoughts for mitigating the attacks as well
as pointers for future work and speciﬁcally on how the proposed method can be further
extended in order to achieve a more in depth investigation of the iOS platform.
2 Related Work
This research work has emphasized into Apple’s iOS security ecosystem since it is
undoubtedly one of the stricter mobile platforms. Android and iOS cover 92.95 % of
mobile market for the last 4 years with an average of 79.1 % and 13.8 % respectively
[26]. Nonetheless, an interesting fact about those mobile platforms, is that iOS users
spend much bigger amounts of money to purchase applications or features on them, in
comparison to Android users [27].
Despite the fact that the huge percentage of software piracy is happening on Jail‐
broken devices, there are a lot of threats against applications’ integrity onto new iDevices
also. By combining a series of weaknesses in the development chain of iOS applications
it is clearly demonstrated that the entire business model of Apple’s App Store is not only
threatened by Jailbreak Development but also it cannot mitigate software piracy.
The majority of research work on the iOS application security model has tried to
attack the security mechanisms through remote exploits or local privilege escalation
vulnerabilities, using memory corruptions and memory leaks with a variety of methods
(Return Oriented Programming, Jump Oriented Programming, Heap Spraying etc.).
Wang et al. in [16] have managed to bypass Apple’s App Store review process and
publish vulnerable applications, while they propose ways to remotely exploit them based
on iOS Framework vulnerabilities. In another paper [15] they propose ways to inject
malicious developer-signed applications to non-jailbroken iOS devices by intercepting
USB and Wi-Fi connection between iDevices and infected computers. Finally, they
claim that infected non Jailbroken devices could act as botnets.
A survey by Zheng et al. [14] evaluates all possible ways through which an appli‐
cation can be distributed to a non Jailbroken iOS device signed with a variety of several
diﬀerent paid certiﬁcates (Developer or Enterprise). During their research they develop
a framework to identify threats induced by the usage of vulnerable iOS private API
(undocumented application programming interfaces) functions. They evaluated 1408
private enterprise applications and they discovered several vulnerabilities and privacy
leaks in their payloads. Finally, they claim that non jailbroken iOS devices can run
cracked iOS applications if the applications have been signed with valid certiﬁcates.
A methodology for repackaging iOS applications executed on new 32Bit iDevices
was published by Livitt [22]. Speciﬁcally, a developer with an enrolled Developer
Account, with an annual cost of $99, can generate provisioning proﬁles (Certiﬁcates)
suitable to resign App Store Applications through Apple’s Developer Portal [24]. After
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performing tests with the tool proposed [23], it was concluded that it was only compatible
with 32 Bit iDevices.
The novelty of the work presented in this paper (Table 1) lies on the fact that it
demonstrates how someone can use any type of application (freeware or paid) freely on
any kind of non Jailbroken iDevice. The above procedure is independent of the iOS
version and the user only needs his/her Apple ID. Furthermore, additional ways that
allow users to access premium features and bypass applications’ additional security
checks are discussed, while additional developer features can be unlocked and used for
reversing third party applications such as automatic network monitoring, memory allo‐
cation debugging and automatic memory leak inspection. Finally, it has been demon‐
strated that in some app purchase cases it is feasible to bypass the payment by modifying
the application’s conﬁguration ﬁles and accessing premium features by replacing legit‐
imate with arbitrary values. This kind of access into third party application ﬁles is
possible because they were supposed to run onto a new iDevice, owned by the developer
who signs them (signed with developer certiﬁcate), for testing purposes.
Table 1. Method comparison
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3 Anatomy of iOS Application
iOS applications can be downloaded through iTunes for conventional devices (Mac, PC)
and via App Store for iDevices (iPhone, iPod, iPad) with an active Apple ID account
being necessary in all cases. An iOS application is a Zip archive, containing several
folders and ﬁles. Every application contains a property list ﬁle with information about
the downloaded ipa (Apple application archive) [21] ﬁle, such us which Apple ID was
used for the purchase, the version of the application, date of creation etc. Another folder
placed in every ipa archive is the Payload folder which carries the application bundle in
app ﬁle extension. Every legitimate application container carries several application
icons, images and ﬁles for the application’s user interface. In order an application to run
in a non Jailbroken iDevice it must contain a valid property list ﬁle placed inside the
folder _CodeSignature. This property list contains hashes of every ﬁle inside the app
container in Base64 format [21]. The property list ﬁle named “info” inside the applica‐
tion container carries information about the executable version, the unique name of the
application (Bundle ID), URLs for the inter app communication mechanism [2] and the
publisher’s identiﬁer. The executable ﬁle of an application is a connotation of ARMv7-
A and ARMv8-A Mach-O executables of the production source code. Any additional
extension or plugin of the application is most of the times placed inside the bundle
folders. For applications developed with swift framework an additional folder exists into
the app container which carries the necessary dynamic libraries for the application’s
execution. Figure 1 depicts the structure that has been already described.
Fig. 1. IPA container
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4 Provisioning Proﬁles
The code sign procedure is based on Public Key Infrastructure implementation which
ensures the integrity of the signed objects and the identity of the parties involved. Theo‐
retically, every developer has a pair of public and private RSA 2048 Bit key. As an
authority, Apple creates developer certiﬁcates based on developers’ public keys, then
uses the SHA-256 hash algorithm to hash the certiﬁcate and eventually signs it with its
private key. The generated developer certiﬁcate has as its only purpose to sign applica‐
tions. When a developer creates an application via Apple’s development tool Xcode and
he/she has attached an iOS device through a USB cable, he/she is allowed to deploy the
application to the iDevice [17]. Automatically after the compilation, an app container
is generated containing the necessary ﬁles in order to be executed onto the iDevice. An
additional ﬁle is generated with extension mobile provision. This speciﬁc ﬁle is a certif‐
icate in the form of a property list that declares the Developer ID which is the creator
of the application, the Bundle ID (Unique Name) of the generated application, the target
device UDID (Unique Device Identiﬁer), the developer’s public key with which the
application has been signed and the permissions of the application. When a developer
needs to test the application onto an iDevice he/she must ﬁrst accept the developer’s
certiﬁcate as being legitimate through the settings of the mobile device. Using this
implementation the parts of the application that have been encrypted with the developer’
s private key can be decrypted through the corresponding public key into the provisioned
iDevice [9, 10]. The trust of this procedure is sealed with the valid certiﬁcate issued by
Apple. The signed executable contains an embedded property list ﬁle, known as enti‐
tlement, which deﬁnes the application’s Bundle ID, the Developer’s ID and the permis‐
sions of the application. The entries of that ﬁle is a subset of the mobile provision’s ﬁle,
as explained before.
5 Attack Types
The objective of this work was to evaluate the tolerance of iOS’s application code
protection mechanisms. Section 5.1 demonstrates all the necessary steps to execute
cracked paid applications in non jailbroken iDevices. In addition to that, we were able
to extend the functionality of various applications by injecting malicious libraries as
add-ons into their original bundle and deploy them also into non jailbroken iDevices.
For the above purposes several 32 and 64 bit iOS devices have been used with various
versions of iOS 9. Our methodology is not automated. Every step is manually driven.
Automating these procedures is out of the scope of this paper.
5.1 Replication
In the experiments several legitimate paid applications, available on Apple’s App Store,
have been used together with several cracked application from various unoﬃcial app
stores, developed with both Objective-C and Swift programming languages. The method
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for loading them onto a non jailbroken iDevice consists of the following steps (illustrated
in Fig. 2):
1. User must ﬁrst install any application legitimate (installed via iTunes or App Store)
or cracked one (3rd party repos) into a Jailbroken iDevice.
2. After having installed a legitimate application onto a 32-bit Jailbroken iOS
Device, we bypass the encryption of the application’s executable by dumping the
decrypted parts loaded in the virtual memory to an ARMv7-A Mach-O file.
Then, we patch the decryption flag. The entire procedure has been carried out
using the LLDB Debugger [20]. Application’s executable decryption can also be
done by automatic tools [29, 30].
3. Following the previous step, we extract the generated executable from the iDevice.
4. Then, we replace the original executable ﬁle of the app container with the cracked
one. Then we modify the Bundle ID (Unique application name) of the original
application listed into the info plist ﬁle inside the container of the application ﬁle,
with a new name that consists of the original application’s name and a random suﬃx.
The random suﬃx that was utilised serves to overcome the fact that every Bundle
ID is reserved and cannot be re-used. It should be stressed that the aforementioned
replacement of the Bundle ID will not work for applications with iCloud or Game
Center extensions.
5. Every iDevice owner is obliged to create an Apple ID account in order to have access
to iTunes, App Store and iCloud. An iDevice allows a limited number of accounts
per device to be created without the use of a credit card. An attacker can create as
many as possible Apple accounts as he/she wants and declare them as developer
accounts without paying the annual fee to activate them. As a result, the fake Apple
accounts remain inactive and although they cannot be used for publishing applica‐
tions to the App Store they can be used for executing application that are under
development to any new iDevice. The exploited vulnerability has been based on the
developers’ ability to deploy their own testing applications to new iOS devices,
through Xcode, without any cost but by simply using an Apple ID registered to
Apple’s Developer Program without enrolment. Consequently, we are able to create
decoy application with the same Bundle ID as that of the modiﬁed application’s
(Legitimate Bundle-ID + Suﬃx) and bind it with the developers account. We let
Xcode to automatically generate a suitable team provisioning proﬁle in order to
deploy the decoy application into a non jailbroken iDevice [12].
6. Before the user launches the decoy application for the ﬁrst time, he/she must accept
the developers team provisioning proﬁle in the iDevices’s Preferences.
7. At this point we are able to dump the entitlement of the generated executable and
merge it with the entitlement of the original one.
8. Then the Xcode tool set [3] was employed to resign the decrypted executable with
our valid developer certiﬁcate, based on the entitlement of the decoys application
executable. It is clear that the bind between a valid certiﬁcate, the Developer’s ID,
the UDID and the Bundle ID of the application, is not enough since Apple cannot
ensure that the developers actually will sign only their own legitimate applications.
By resigning an application the Code Signature folder is regenerated and that allows
the application to be deployed in an iDevice that has approved the developer’s public
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key. Finally the signed cracked application has been deployed onto a non jailbroken
iDevice by cheating Xcode in the sense that the cracked application has been gener‐
ated by the owner of the certiﬁcate that signs it. Due to the backward compatibility
of ARM processors we were able to execute the decrypted 32 Bit armv7 executable
(generated by the 32 Bit architecture of Jailbroken iPhone 5) to new iDevices with
64 and 32 Bit architectures respectively.
Fig. 2. Replication method
5.2 Malicious Payload Injection
Another issue that aﬀects applications developed with the Objective-C language is the
ability to hook functions of application’s classes as described by Livitt [22]. After the
decryption and extraction of an iOS application’s executable (Step 1 Fig. 3), an attacker
can reverse engineer it through static and dynamic analysis and discover the usability
and functionality of its functions. Thus the attacker can take advantage of the Objective-
C [13] language method calling to create dynamic libraries (Step 2 Fig. 3) and hook
application’s class functions and modify the passing and return values or even inject
malicious payloads to them. The most suitable tool for this kind of extensions is the
Theos framework [11]. This tool in combination with the iOS Software Development
Kit and Cydia Substrate framework [19] is able to generate hooking dynamic libraries.
For the purposes of our research we used an ARMv7-A image of Cydia Substrate suitable
for both 32 and 64 Bit iOS 9 iDevices and we statically linked the Cydia Substrate to
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the generated dynamic library (Step 4 Fig. 3). Then we statically linked it into the cracked
executable (Step 3 Fig. 3) and place it inside the application container (Step 5 Fig. 3).
Due to the additional modiﬁcations it is necessary to resign (Step 6 Fig. 3) the cracked
executable and the additional dynamic libraries, with the entitlements of a decoy appli‐
cation as Sect. 5.1. Having the ability to hook Objective-C iOS application’s class func‐
tions, an attacker can modify an application’s behavior, bypass security checks, compro‐
mise application’s transactions integrity and extend functionality in order to unlock
premium features.
Fig. 3. Library injection
The aforementioned procedures can be performed by any owner of a non Jailbroken
iOS 32 Bit or 64 bit Device with a free registration to the Apple Developer Program
without enrolling his/her Apple ID and with access to a Mac or to a virtual machine of
Mac OS X with Xcode installed. A further impact of signing third parties’ applications
as ‘under test’ ones, is that an attacker can unlock several developer features such as the
ability to inspect memory allocations and automatically investigate and debug memory
leaks throw default system tools preinstalled into any OS X.
6 Conclusions
Both cases may lead to serious ﬁnancial impacts in the business model of paid and free
(with in app purchases features) applications. From an economic standpoint, App Store
is the largest digital distribution platform for mobile apps with the total amount of
revenue from app sales since 2008 being at approximately 15 billion of United States
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Dollars [7]. The use of a functional cracked application deprives the developers of the
proﬁt before taxes, which is equal to 70 % of the application’s price. Also, there is a loss
for Apple which amounts to the rest 30 % of the sale [28]. We were able not only to run
paid and repackaged applications freely into non jailbroken iDevices but we were also
able to have full access to their conﬁguration ﬁles because we sign them as testing
applications and gain paid features and bypass Apple in app purchase model by modify
their data.
Running Apple ID signed applications onto not modiﬁed iDevices enlarge the attack
surface of iOS platform because in combination with exploitable memory corruptions
and Kernel vulnerabilities Jailbreak developers can deploy their own vulnerable apps in
order to directly attack the iOS Kernel. In this paper we leverage the opportunity for
unenrolled iOS developers to run freely their under developing application into their
iDevices for test purposes and we prove that cracked and repackaged applications can
be executed freely into every non Jailbroken devices regardless the version of the oper‐
ating system.
The immediate revocation of non enrolled developer code signature certiﬁcates will
only reduce the ability of iOS device owners to use cracked or malformed application
to their devices, and not to eliminate that malicious activities because of the alternative
equivalent methods accomplished that with enrolled developer and enterprise accounts
[8]. The only way that this type of threat can be eliminated is by robust obfuscation for
any generated application’s executable. Another common vulnerability we faced during
our research was the lack of encrypted values into applications ﬁle settings which gave
us the ability to modify values related with vulnerable in app purchases implementations.
Moreover it is recommended for application developers to redevelop immediately the
Objective-C applications available in the App Store to their equivalent Swift editions
and for Apple the design of a pure Swift framework for all the iDevices operation system.
Our research is based on framework vulnerabilities and security mechanisms imple‐
mented in mobile applications. Consequently, we aim to extend our research for Android
and Windows Phone applications. For Android application a malicious payload is able
to be injected into a repackaged application container with a crafted C/C++ library or
with Dalvik byte code injection. Similar to Android we will try to generalize those
methods to Windows Phone’s Applications to inject .NET assembly code into them in
order to evaluate the possibility of creation prepackaged tweaked applications for this
platform. Our ﬁnal objective is to categorize common vulnerabilities in applications and
ways they can be exploited based on the mobile platform they are implemented in order
to suggest user space integrated methods for application integrity protection suitable for
any mobile operating system.
Finally, the above ﬁnancial and statistical data we provided are because of the seri‐
ousness of the attack and the potential losses if an escalated attack against paid or
vulnerable credit based in app purchase implementations could be done.
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